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Budget Deficits and Debt
By Goran Persson
I
t is with mixed feelings that I participate in
this overview panel. On the one hand, it is a
real honor for me to participate in this years
symposium with such distinguished participants.
On the other hand, I understand that the reason
for my invitation lies in the enormous financial
problems Sweden has experienced in the past few
years.
The topic of this years symposium is Budget
Deficits and Debt: Issues and Options. The
firstand maybe the most obviousquestion
we face, is whether we lack the knowledge of how
to balance the budget. My answer is no.
The second question is, if we know what has to
be done, why do we not do it? This is a political
question.
In a deficit situation, politicians face a difficult
task. Representatives are usually elected to make
the voters better off. But when there is a deficit
problem, they have to deal with questions they
are not familiar with, and perhaps not prepared
for. Expenditures have to be cut. Taxes have to
be raised.
These questions are extremely difficult to handle.
That is why a successful consolidation process
must have strong support from the people. As a
politician, you have to be able to turn the edge
of the debate against those who do not want to
take harsh measures.
I would like to make three general observations
as to what I believe is needed to make a consoli-
dation program effective. But before that, let me
say that dealing with such a program is not only
difficult, but also dangerous. The politician who
stands behind a consolidation process must be
prepared to put his or her office at stake.
First, the consolidation program must be
designed so that the burdens of consolidation are
shared fairly. Otherwise, support for the harsh
policy would quickly deteriorate, and Parliament
would lose the political will to make tough
decisions. Without reasonably strong public sup-
port and understanding, no policy can be very
successful.
Second, the consolidation program has to be
designed as a comprehensive package; an ad hoc
hodgepodge of measures will only have a limited
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31September 2, 1995.chance of success. By presenting the measures
together, it becomes clear to all interest groups
that they are not the only ones asked to make
sacrifices.
Third, the whole process must be as transparent
as possible. Honesty toward the citizensnever
play down the effects of the measures. Honesty
toward the marketalways clarify assumptions
and calculations. Never try to fool anybody by
using gimmicks or bookkeeping tricks. Only
then can credibility be recovered; only then can
the program earn legitimacy.
A consolidation process consists of two phases:
doing it, and holding on to it. Even if the first
phase is successful, renewed resistance will
appear when the measures affect the voters own
pockets. The government has to be able to say,
This is not news. We have said all along that
getting public finances in order is extremely
harsh and that it requires large sacrifices from
everybody throughout society. Otherwise the
whole process can be threatened by different
interest groups.
Never say that it wont hurt. Never say that this
is peanuts.
Let me now turn to the particular Swedish
situation. In the early 1990s, Sweden experienced
its deepest recession since the 1930s. To cut a
long story short, in three years public debt
doubled, unemployment tripled, and public
deficit increased tenfold. In 1994, the general
government budget deficit was the largest in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) area, 10 percent of GDP.
Basically, the reason for this explosion of pub-
lic debt was a collapse in domestic demand. One
important factor was an increase in the house-
hold savings ratio by no less than 13 percentage
points.
The new government that took office in Octo-
ber 1994 had to react, and act firmly. 
Only by substantially reducing the deficit could
Sweden achieve stability and sustainable growth.
The reinforcement program will strengthen
public finances by 7.5 percent of GDP per year.
I want to underline that this refers only to
measures already passed by Parliament. 
The program is front-loaded; 3.5 percentage
points have taken effect this year and a further 2
percent will come into force in 1996. Almost
two-thirds of the measures are spending cuts. The
main part relates to transfers and central govern-
ment consumption.
Even though there is a general public under-
standing of the seriousness of the budget situation,
a positive and long-run acceptance of the consoli-
dation program presupposes that the burden is
distributed fairly among different groups in society.
This is extremely important in Sweden where the
election participation ratio is over 90 percent.
So what are the results of our consolidation
program?
With modest assumptions on growth and inter-
est rates, we expect a gradual reduction of the
deficit. In 1996 we will stabilize public debt
relative to GDP. Our goal is to meet the Maas-
tricht criteria of a deficit of 3 percent in 1997,
and to balance public finances by 1998.
This goal is supported by 94 percent in
Parliament.
Even though Sweden has a large budget deficit,
the economy is running smoothly. We have a
current account surplus of almost 3 percent for
this year, private investments are up 20 percent,
and employment has increased by 2.5 percent this
year.
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with spending cuts and tax increases. But it would
have been even harder if we had not done any-
thing at all. The opinion polls are now pointing
in the right direction for the government.
Now we have taken a grip on public finances.
This was the first phase of our consolidation
program. But there is also a second phasethe phase
of sticking to the program. This phase consists of
monitoring public finances, taking care of insti-
tutional weaknesses, and fighting inflation.
According to the Maastricht Treaty, Sweden
must submit a so-called convergence program.
In this program, we monitor public finances
once a year in order to put them in order. This
convergence program is public, as is everything
relating to our consolidation program.
Yesterday, Rob Johnson from Moore Capital
Management told us that when something unex-
pected takes place in Mexico, it will spill over to
other countries with problems, such as Sweden.
This vulnerability can only be reduced by being
transparent and extremely open toward the capi-
tal markets. One budget gimmick and we lose
confidence that could take years to regain. So far,
I have never had to revise a budget deficit esti-
mate in the wrong direction. It is of great impor-
tance that the Ministry of Finance is conservative
in predicting deficits and debts.
In order to avoid unsustainable budgetary out-
comes in the future, the institutional framework
has been improved recently. Parliament has
passed a resolution according to which the total
volume of expenditure, as well as expenditures
for specific areas, will be established in the
initial stage of the budget preparation in Par-
liament. That means that Parliament cannot pass
a budget that is weaker than the one presented by
the government.
Parliament has decided to extend the period
between elections from three to four years. This
is likely to provide a better basis for a consistent
and responsible fiscal policy. 
The government has proposed the imposition
of a multiyear ceiling on public expenditure. An
expenditure ceiling is more operational in nature
than a deficit target and is possible to monitor
on a continuous basis. 
The government will also prohibit local gov-
ernments borrowing for consumption.
Sweden experienced high inflation in the 1970s
and 1980s. This did not work then, and I am even
more confident that it will not work in the 1990s.
I believe that the single most important factor in
fighting inflation is to create public resistance to
it. I have started a process of education on the
dangers of inflation. My message to the Swedish
people is that, in order to avoid unemployment
and further cuts in the social security system,
inflation has to be kept low.
Last year the Swedish economy followed a very
dangerous road with public finances out of control,
high unemployment, and an increasing mistrust
among the public about the ability of democratic
institutions to deal with the problems. It is not
an exaggeration to say that the rapid increase in
the public debt challenged the whole idea of
democracy.  Since the government had to borrow
money from the capital markets, power was
shifted from the elected representatives to the
owners of capital.
This is a very strong political message. And it
is this message that has made the prospects for
sound public finances look much better now
than they did just a year ago.
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